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NOTE
Vindicating the Effective Vindication Exception:
Protecting Federal Statutory Rights in the Employment
Context
I. Introduction
Arbitration is a form of alternate dispute resolution that allows parties to
submit a dispute to an independent third party for resolution.1 Arbitration
serves the purpose of resolving disputes between parties without involving
the traditional judicial process.2 The terms and procedures for arbitration
are dictated by an arbitration agreement, and barring a few exceptions,3 the
decision to arbitrate is binding upon the parties.4 Under federal law, courts
treat arbitration agreements as a matter of contract.5 The primary benefits of
arbitration are the reduced cost and quicker resolution of disputes as
compared to the traditional legal process.6 Critics of arbitration, however,
point out that arbitration can easily become more expensive than the
traditional legal process when one accounts for the costs associated with the
arbitral forum, including arbitrator fees and administrative costs.7
In recent decades, as the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly
expressed a federal preference for the enforcement of arbitration
agreements, corporations have increasingly begun to insert arbitration
clauses in form contracts with employees.8 This increase in mandatory
arbitration in the employment context can create problems for employees
when a dispute with their employer arises. Unlike arbitration agreements
between sophisticated, repeat-player corporations in which both sides
voluntarily accept the terms, arbitration agreements in the employment
context often create inequities between parties as a result of boilerplate

1. 1 JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 6:1 (3d ed. 2016).
2. Id.
3. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012).
4. GRENIG, supra note 1, § 12:20.
5. See 9 U.S.C. § 2.
6. GRENIG, supra note 1, § 6:2.
7. Id.
8. See Lauren Guth Barnes, How Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Class Action
Waivers Undermine Consumer Rights and Why We Need Congress to Act, 9 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 329, 336 (2015); Michele L. Giovagnoli, Comment, To Be or Not to Be?: Recent
Resistance to Mandatory Arbitration Agreements in the Employment Arena, 64 UMKC L.
REV. 547, 555 (1996).
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language, ignorance of what arbitration entails, and unequal bargaining
power.
One particular concern with mandatory arbitration in the employment
context involves the de facto waiver of federal statutory rights. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed the compelled arbitration of claims
that arise out of federal statutory rights.9 Now, some commentators have
voiced concern that individuals will be increasingly forced to forego federal
statutory claims because the filing fees and costs associated with arbitration
make it economically unfeasible to pursue those claims.10 The combination
of compelled arbitration and the often prohibitive costs associated with
arbitration can lead to situations in which a prospective litigant is barred
from vindicating his or her federal statutory rights in court, and is likewise
unable to vindicate those rights in the arbitral forum because arbitration
costs may far exceed his or her potential recovery.11
One solution to this problem exists in the form of the “effective
vindication” exception to the arbitration of federal statutory rights. The
effective vindication doctrine invalidates arbitration agreements that thwart
a party from “effectively . . . vindicat[ing] its statutory cause of action in
the arbitral forum.”12 Although the effective vindication exception provides
an avenue for courts to protect important federal statutory rights, recent
developments in the doctrine have created an open question as to the true
breadth of the exception.13
In the most recent Supreme Court analysis of the effective vindication
exception, the Court construed the exception narrowly, suggesting that it
applies only to arbitration agreements that “constitute the elimination of the
right to pursue” a federal statutory right.14 This narrow conception of the
effective vindication exception appears to limit its application to arbitration
agreements that expressly forbid the assertion of a federal statutory right or
9. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013);
Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91–92 (2000); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985).
10. Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 133 (2004).
11. Id. at 133–34.
12. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 637.
13. Compare Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2311 (2013) (focusing effective vindication
exception analysis on the party’s “right to pursue” federal statutory claims), with Nesbitt v.
FCNH, Inc., 811 F.3d 371, 377 (2016) (focusing effective vindication exception on whether
arbitration agreement provides party with an “effective and accessible” forum).
14. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2311.
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to those that result in “filing and administrative fees . . . that are so high as
to make access to [arbitration] impracticable.”15
Based on its decision in Shankle v. B-G Maintenance,16 and more
recently in Nesbitt v. FCNH, Inc.,17 the Tenth Circuit charted a separate
path regarding the application of the effective vindication exception. The
Tenth Circuit applies the effective vindication exception to arbitration
agreements that forbid the assertion of federal statutory rights and to
agreements that do not provide an “effective and accessible alternative
forum.”18 By considering the totality of the effects the arbitration has on a
litigant’s ability to vindicate his or her federal statutory rights, the Tenth
Circuit’s approach to the effective vindication exception offers a better
balance between the federal preference for enforcing arbitration and the
needs of prospective litigants who face a significant disadvantage in terms
of sophistication, bargaining power, and financial resources.
This Note explores the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the effective
vindication exception. Part II traces the development of the law regarding
the general enforceability of arbitration agreements and the effective
vindication exception prior to Nesbitt. Part III examines the factual and
procedural background of Nesbitt and the Tenth Circuit’s rational for
invalidating the arbitration agreement involved. Part IV explores the
potential benefits and consequences of Nesbitt, both for individuals seeking
to invalidate arbitration agreements and for businesses seeking to enforce
those agreements, as well as for the future of arbitration as a whole. Finally,
Part V explains why courts should adopt the Tenth Circuit’s approach in
Nesbitt so as to better effectuate the effective vindication exception and the
ultimate purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act.
II. Law Before the Case
A. The Federal Arbitration Act and Initial Non-Arbitrability of Federal
Statutory Rights
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to “reverse
the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . . . and to place
arbitration upon the same footing as other contracts.”19 In pertinent part, the
FAA provides that:
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 2310–11.
163 F.3d 1230, 1234 (10th Cir. 1999).
811 F.3d at 380–81.
Id. at 377 (emphasis added).
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
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A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.20
Other portions of the FAA allow for a judicial stay when a dispute may be
subject to arbitration and, when necessary, an order compelling a party to
comply with its agreement to arbitrate a dispute.21 Together these
provisions demonstrate a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements.”22 Because of this federal preference for arbitration, courts
have come to “‘rigorously enforce’ arbitration agreements according to
their terms.”23
While it is now well-established that this federal preference for
arbitration includes agreements to arbitrate federal statutory claims, this
was not always the case. For the first sixty years of the FAA’s existence,
the Supreme Court did not permit the arbitration of federal statutory
claims.24 The Court first voiced its opposition to the arbitration of federal
statutory rights in Wilko v. Swan.25 Wilko involved an arbitration agreement
that covered federal statutory rights guaranteed by the Securities Act of
1933.26 The Securities Act of 1933 includes a provision which renders void
“[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any
security to waive compliance with any provision of [the Act].”27 The Court
invalidated the agreement to arbitrate claims arising under the Securities
Act of 1933, noting that “the intention of Congress concerning the sale of
securities is better carried out by holding invalid such an agreement for
arbitration of issues arising under the Act.”28
Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Wilko provides insight to the Court’s
current position on the arbitrability of federal statutory rights. Justice
20. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
21. Id. §§ 3, 4.
22. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
23. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013).
24. Okezie Chukwumerije, The Evolution and Decline of the Effective-Vindication
Doctrine in U.S. Arbitration Law, 14 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 375, 394 (2014).
25. 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).
26. Id. at 428–29.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2012).
28. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
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Frankfurter disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that arbitration would
be inappropriate for issues arising under the Securities Act.29 He pointed
out that “[a]rbitrators may not disregard the law” and their doing so would
“constitute grounds for vacating the award pursuant to section 10 of the
Federal Arbitration Act.”30 In his opinion, the advantages of allowing
claims arising under the Securities Act to be resolved by arbitration
outweighed the Court’s concern that an arbitrator’s decision would be
inferior to the judicial forum and would jeopardize a plaintiff’s federal
statutory rights.31
B. The Development of the Effective Vindication Exception
As arbitration increased in popularity, the Court was forced to rethink its
position on the arbitrability of federal statutory claims. The rule forbidding
the arbitration of federal statutory claims conflicted with the Court’s
developing preference for arbitration.32 In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Court finally addressed this conflict head-on.33
Mitsubishi involved a dispute between two international companies, a
Japanese car manufacturer (Mitsubishi) and a Puerto Rican distributor
(Soler Chrysler-Plymouth).34 The two companies entered into a Distributor
Agreement and Sales Agreement whereby Soler Chrysler-Plymouth would
sell cars produced by Mitsubishi.35 The Sales Agreement included an
arbitration clause which provided that “[a]ll disputes, controversies, or
differences which may arise between [Mitsubishi] and [Soler] . . . shall be
finally settled by arbitration in Japan in accordance with the rules and
regulations of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association.”36
After multiple disagreements arose between Mitsubishi and Soler
regarding poor sales performance and Mitsubishi’s resulting refusal to
divert certain shipments, Mitsubishi brought an action in the United States
District Court for the District of Puerto Rico seeking enforcement of the
29. Id. at 440 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
30. Id. (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445, rev’d Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S.
427).
31. Id. at 439–40.
32. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25
(1983); Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionary Workers Union, 430
U.S. 243, 255 (1977); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 582–83 (1960).
33. 473 U.S. 614, 616 (1985).
34. Id. at 616–17.
35. Id. at 617.
36. Id.
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arbitration agreement under the FAA.37 Soler counterclaimed, alleging,
among other things, a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.38
In reversing the Court’s previous course, the Mitsubishi Court rejected
the Wilko non-arbitrability doctrine in favor of the liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration.39 Dismissing concerns about the protection of
important statutory rights, the Court explained that “[in] agreeing to
arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral,
rather than a judicial, forum.”40 Thus, the Court extended the strong
presumption in favor of arbitration to arbitration agreements concerning
federal statutory rights.41
Even as it expanded the breadth of the FAA, the Court rejected the
notion that its holding in Mitsubishi implied that “all controversies
implicating statutory rights are suitable for arbitration.”42 Rather, the Court
laid out the framework for the effective vindication exception, stating that
“so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory
cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both
its remedial and deterrent function.”43 But if the provisions of an arbitration
agreement would operate to waive a litigant’s right to pursue a statutory
remedy, the Court “would have little hesitation in condemning the
agreement as against public policy.”44 So while the Court determined that
the FAA permitted the arbitration of federal statutory claims, it also
reserved the right to invalidate any arbitration agreement that threatens to
undermine the vindication of federal statutory rights.45
Subsequent to Mitsubishi, the Court has recognized the effective
vindication exception but has never applied it to invalidate an arbitration
agreement.46 The Supreme Court’s apparent hesitation in invoking the
37. Id. at 618 (alterations in original).
38. Id. at 619-20.
39. Id. at 639–40.
40. Id. at 628.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 627.
43. Id. at 637 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 637 n.19.
45. See Robert Ward, Note, Divide & Conquer: How the Supreme Court Used the
Federal Arbitration Act to Threaten Statutory Rights and the Need to Codify the Effective
Vindication Rule, 39 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 149, 155–56 (2015).
46. See, e.g., 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 273–74 (2009); Green Tree
Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91–92 (2000); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991).
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effective vindication exception therefore suggests that a party claiming the
exception likely faces a heavy burden in proving its applicability.47
However, the Tenth Circuit’s application of the effective vindication
exception in Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management of Colorado, Inc.,
provided a more forgiving burden for a party seeking to invalidate an
arbitration agreement.48 In Shankle, the Tenth Circuit invalidated an
arbitration agreement between an employee and his employer that required
the employee to pay one-half of the arbitrator’s fees.49 The arbitration
agreement’s failure to provide an “accessible forum” for the employee to
assert his Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) claims “clearly
undermine[d] the remedial and deterrent functions of the federal antidiscrimination laws.”50 The Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the effective
vindication rule clearly set a lower bar for application of the exception than
the Supreme Court evinced in its earlier decisions.51
The most detailed analysis of the effective vindication exception
performed by the Supreme Court since Mitsubishi occurred in Green Tree
Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph.52 Green Tree involved an
arbitration agreement between Green Tree (a lender) and Randolph (a
borrower).53 When Randolph brought a claim against Green Tree under the
Truth in Lending Act (TILA), Green Tree filed a motion to compel
arbitration.54 Randolph asked the district court to invalidate the arbitration
agreement because her lack of financial resources coupled with the steep
costs of arbitration would force her to “forgo her [federal statutory] claims
against [Green Tree].”55
While the Court declined to apply the effective vindication exception to
Randolph’s TILA claims, it provided some insight into what type of
circumstances would trigger the exception. The Court mused that while
“the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant . . . from
effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum,”56
47. Olga Bykov, Note, Vindication of Federal Statutory Rights: The Future of CostBased Challenges to Arbitration Clauses After American Express v. Italian Colors
Restaurant and Green Tree v. Randolph, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1323, 1341 (2017).
48. 163 F.3d 1230, 1234 (10th Cir. 1999).
49. Id. at 1234-35.
50. Id. at 1235.
51. See cases cited supra note 13.
52. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
53. Id. at 82.
54. Id. at 83.
55. Id. at 83–84.
56. Id. at 90.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

768

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:761

the mere “risk” that a litigant may face prohibitive costs was not enough to
trigger the exception.57 Instead, a party seeking to invoke the effective
vindication exception must show a “likelihood” that he or she will actually
incur prohibitive costs.58 The Court did not elaborate, however, on the level
of detail a party must provide before the party seeking to compel arbitration
must supply evidence to the contrary.59
After Green Tree, the contours of effective vindication rule became
clearer: an agreement to arbitrate a federal statutory claim would be
enforced unless the challenging party could demonstrate that the arbitration
agreement would prohibit the party from effectively vindicating those
rights.60 Circumstances that would trigger the effective vindication
exception included, at a minimum, agreements that expressly waived
federal statutory rights or imposed prohibitively large arbitration costs. 61
Moreover, the party challenging the enforceability of the agreement bears
the burden of demonstrating the existence of those circumstances.62
C. Limitations on the Effective Vindication Exception
Prior to American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,63 the Court’s
effective vindication exception existed as set forth in Mitsubishi and Green
Tree. In Italian Colors, rather than more clearly defining the exception, the
Court instead chose to curtail its applicability.
In the case, a group of merchants commenced a class action against
American Express for violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act and
section 4 of the Clayton Act.64 The agreement between American Express
and the merchants required that all disputes arising out of the contractual
relationship be submitted to arbitration.65 Additionally, each merchant was
required to arbitrate individually, as the agreement expressly prohibited
class arbitration.66 While the district court granted American Express’s
motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the class action, the Second
Circuit reversed the decision, due in part to the prohibitive costs the
57. Id. at 91.
58. Id. at 92.
59. Id.
60. Chukwumerije, supra note 24, at 400.
61. Id.
62. See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90–92; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985).
63. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
64. Id. at 2308.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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merchants would incur if “compelled to arbitrate under the class action
waiver.”67
On appeal to the Supreme Court, after determining that the parties
voluntarily submitted to arbitration and that no “contrary congressional
command” compelled the Court to invalidate the arbitration agreement, the
Court turned to consideration of the effective vindication rule.68 The Court
began by noting that the effective vindication exception “originated as
dictum in Mitsubishi Motors” out of concern for arbitration agreements that
eliminate a party’s “right to pursue” federal statutory claims.69 By reducing
the exception to mere dictum, the Court created ample space to redefine the
scope of the rule.
Focusing in particular on the right to pursue statutory remedies instead of
the ability to effectively vindicate those remedies, the Court narrowed the
exception to cover only arbitration agreements that actually prohibit a party
from accessing the arbitral forum. Thus, the exception “would certainly
cover a provision . . . forbidding the assertion of certain statutory rights”
and “would perhaps cover filing and administrative fees attached to
arbitration that are so high as to make access to the forum impracticable.”70
This new iteration of the effective vindication exception seemingly
eliminates collateral costs not specific to the arbitral forum, such as the
costs of attorney’s fees, expert witnesses, and production of evidence.71
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion made clear “the fact that it is not worth the
expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the
elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”72
In a strong dissent, Justice Kagan objected to Justice Scalia’s
characterization of the effective vindication exception as mere dicta and to
his application of the exception to the facts presented in Italian Colors.73
Justice Kagan pointed out that by refusing to apply the effective vindication
exception to the agreement between American Express and the merchants,
the Court effectively allowed American Express to insulate itself from
private enforcement of both the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, because
the cost of proving an antitrust violation (between several hundred thousand
67.
2009)).
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. (quoting In re Am. Express Merchant’s Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 315-16 (2d Cir.
Id. at 2309.
Id. at 2310.
Id. (emphasis added).
See Bykov, supra note 47, at 1349, 1353.
Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2311.
Id. at 2317–18, 2317 n.3 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

770

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:761

and one million dollars) far exceeds the potential recovery for individual
merchants ($38,549 in Italian Colors Restaurant’s case).74 Justice Kagan
asserted that this was precisely the type of prohibitive cost the exception
was meant to safeguard against, because “[n]o rational actor would bring a
claim worth tens of thousands of dollars if doing so meant incurring costs in
the hundreds of thousands.”75
The Court’s newest limitation of the effective vindication exception in
Italian Colors led many commentators to wonder what remains of the
rule.76 Moreover, Italian Colors seemed to directly conflict with the Tenth
Circuit’s application of the effective vindication rule set forth in Shankle.
Just two years later, the Tenth Circuit was presented an opportunity to
reconsider the effective vindication exception in light of the developments
at the Supreme Court level.
III. Nesbitt v. FCNH, Inc.
A. Facts
Rhonda Nesbitt brought an action against FCNH, Inc. and five other
defendants in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado
on April 7, 2014, for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and
state labor laws.77 FCNH and the other defendants owned and operated
thirty-one for-profit schools that offered education in massage therapy, skin
care, and esthetics.78 These schools required students to provide services to
the public but did not compensate the students for providing such
services.79
Nesbitt enrolled in one of the defendants’ schools, the Denver School of
Massage Therapy, and was required to provide uncompensated services to
the public as a part of her curriculum.80 When Nesbitt enrolled, she signed
an enrollment contract that included an arbitration clause.81 This clause
required arbitration of any dispute arising out her enrollment at the school,

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 2316.
Id.
See, e.g., Bykov, supra note 47, at 1336; Chukwumerije, supra note 24, at 449.
Nesbitt v. FCNH, Inc., 811 F.3d 371, 375 (10th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 373.
Id. at 374.
Id.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss3/7

2018]

NOTE

771

the educational services provided to her by the school, or any other related
matter.82 The agreement also stated the following:
Arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the
Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association
applying federal law to the fullest extent possible, and the
substantive and procedural provisions of the Federal Arbitration
Act shall govern this Arbitration Agreement and any and all
issues relating to the enforcement of Arbitration Agreement and
the arbitrability of the claims between the parties.83
Finally, the arbitration agreement provided that “[e]ach party shall bear
the expense of its own counsel, experts, witnesses, and preparation and
presentation of the proofs,” and allowed students to opt out of the
arbitration agreement by mailing in a signed rejection notice.84 Nesbitt
failed to comply with the opt-out procedures required by the arbitration
agreement.85
B. District Court Proceedings
After Nesbitt brought suit, FCNH and the other defendants filed a motion
to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration
agreement.86 Although the district court agreed with the defendants that the
arbitration agreement “[wa]s not procedurally unconscionable” because
Nesbitt was provided with ample opportunity to review the contract and opt
out of the arbitration agreement, it denied the defendants’ motion on other
grounds.87 The court turned to the effective vindication exception, finding
that two provisions of the arbitration agreement served to “prevent Ms.
Nesbitt . . . from effectively vindicating [her] statutory rights under the
FLSA,”88 including (1) a section requiring that arbitration be conducted
according to the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration
Association, and (2) a section requiring each party to bear its own expenses
in proving its case in arbitration.89 The district court agreed with Nesbitt’s
contention that together these two provisions imposed a prohibitively high
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 374–75.
Id. at 378.
Id. at 375.
Nesbitt v. FCNH, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1366, 1372 (D. Colo. 2014).
Id. at 1373.
Id.
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cost on Nesbitt’s ability to vindicate her claim in the arbitral forum, thereby
making the agreement unenforceable under the effective vindication
exception.90 In agreeing with Nesbitt’s effective vindication argument, the
district court relied on Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management of
Colorado, Inc., which held an arbitration agreement unenforceable because
it placed the employee-plaintiff “between the proverbial rock and a hard
place—it prohibited use of the judicial forum, where a litigant is not
required to pay for a judge’s services, and the prohibitive cost [of
arbitration] substantially limited use of the arbitral forum.”91
The district court understood Shankle as standing for the proposition that
“an arbitration agreement requiring a plaintiff to share in the costs of
arbitration is unenforceable when the agreement effectively deprives the
plaintiff of an accessible forum to resolve his statutory claims and vindicate
his statutory rights.”92 The district court’s interpretation of Shankle and
application of the effective vindication exception greatly differs from the
Supreme Court’s approach in Italian Colors. Rather than focusing on a
party’s technical right or ability to vindicate a federal statutory claim in the
arbitral forum (as Italian Colors instructed), the district court focused
instead on the accessibility of the arbitral forum.93 While this approach
undoubtedly provides more protection to individuals who have signed
arbitration agreements, it runs counter to the “liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration” and the Court’s narrow application of the effective vindication
exception.94 Nevertheless, finding no savings clause in the arbitration
agreement, the district court invalidated the entire arbitration agreement as
unenforceable.95
C. Tenth Circuit Decision
On appeal, the issue before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was
whether the district court properly applied the effective vindication
exception.96 This forced the Tenth Circuit to address the incongruity
between its conception of the effective vindication exception in Shankle and

90. Id.
91. 163 F.3d 1230, 1235 (1999).
92. Nesbitt, 74 F. Supp. at 1373 (quoting Daugherty v. Encana Oil & Gas (USA), Inc.,
No. 10-CV-02272-WJM-KLM, 2011 WL 2791338, at *10 (D. Colo. July 15, 2011)).
93. See cases cited supra note 13 and accompanying text.
94. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625
(1985); see also Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310-11 (2013).
95. Nesbitt v. FCNH, Inc., 811 F.3d 371, 376 (10th Cir. 2016).
96. Id.
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the Supreme Court’s most recent application of the exception in Italian
Colors.97
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by reiterating the general effective
vindication exception rule: agreements to arbitrate are invalid when they
“operate as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory
remedies.”98 While the Tenth Circuit made mention of language the
Supreme Court used in Italian Colors—language indicating that the
effective vindication exception “would certainly cover a provision . . .
forbidding the assertion of certain statutory rights” and possibly “filing and
administrative fees attached to arbitration that are so high as to make access
to the forum impracticable”99—the Tenth Circuit did not follow such a
narrow interpretation of the effective vindication exception.
Instead, the Tenth Circuit, like the district court below, relied on Shankle
and focused not only on the right to access the arbitral forum, but also on
the practical ability to access the forum.100 The court’s effective vindication
rule set forth in Nesbitt invalidates any arbitration agreement when factors
specific to the arbitral forum act to “prevent an individual from effectively
vindicating his or her statutory rights.”101 Having determined that the
effective vindication exception applies when an arbitration agreement
denies a litigant an “effective and accessible alternative forum,” the court
then considered whether Nesbitt met her burden under Green Tree to show
that the arbitration agreement imposed prohibitive costs that would trigger
the effective vindication exception.102
The defendants first argued that Nesbitt was precluded from asserting the
effective vindication doctrine because she failed to utilize the opt-out
provision that would have “eliminated any dispute regarding the cost of
arbitration.”103 The Tenth Circuit flatly rejected this argument because
Nesbitt’s failure to opt out indicated that she voluntarily entered into the
arbitration agreement and had no bearing on whether that agreement
imposed costs that would trigger the exception.104 Next, the court rejected
the defendants’ contention that Nesbitt’s failure to “pursue the possibility of
deferred or reduced [arbitration] fees” meant that she failed to meet her
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See generally id.
Id. at 377.
Id. (quoting Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310–11).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 378.
Id.
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burden.105 The court noted that because Nesbitt would “be[] at the mercy”
of the arbitrator as to whether she would be forced to shoulder prohibitive
arbitration costs, relying on deferred or reduced fees did not facilitate the
effective vindication of her rights under the FLSA.106 Finally, the
defendants argued that Nesbitt failed to meet her burden under the effective
vindication exception because she did not provide “evidence regarding the
cost of prosecuting her class or collective action claims.”107 The court flatly
rejected this argument because the defendants failed to raise the argument
below.108
Because the Tenth Circuit concluded that the effective vindication
exception could apply to prohibitively expensive arbitration agreements and
that Nesbitt met the burden required by Green Tree, it affirmed the district
court’s decision to invalidate the arbitration agreement. In doing so, the
Tenth Circuit reaffirmed Shankle and its broader application of the effective
vindication doctrine. Adoption of the Tenth Circuit’s approach by other
courts would present the best opportunity for courts to both remain true to
the federal preference for arbitration and protect the federal statutory rights
of relatively powerless individuals.
IV. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit’s conception of the effective vindication exception
strikes the ideal balance between the protection of consumers’ and
employees’ federal statutory rights and the enforcement of valid arbitration
agreements while also remaining consistent with the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Green Tree and Italian Colors. While Italian Colors forecloses
the use of class action waivers as a justification for the invalidation of
otherwise valid arbitration agreements under the effective vindication
exception,109 the doctrine remains alive and well with respect to costs
directly associated with the arbitral forum.110 Lower courts have recognized
this distinction post-Italian Colors and have found that the effective
vindication exception can be used to invalidate arbitration agreements when

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 379.
Id. (citing Martinez v. Angel Expl., LLC, 798 F.3d 968, 974 (10th Cir. 2015)).
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013).
Bykov, supra note 47, at 1348–49.
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arbitration-specific costs prevent a plaintiff from vindicating its federal
statutory claims.111
In the absence of any legislation codifying the effective vindication
exception in the FAA,112 courts should adopt the Tenth Circuit’s approach
to the effective vindication exception for two reasons. First, applying the
effective vindication exception to arbitration-specific costs that inhibit the
practical ability to access the arbitral forum offers more protection for
employees and consumers who possess little bargaining power. And
second, companies seeking to impose mandatory arbitration on employees
or consumers can still craft mandatory arbitration agreements that may help
to reduce litigation while still allowing the vindication of federal statutory
rights.
Subsequent to the Supreme Court’s decision to abandon the nonarbitrability doctrine in the 1980s and 1990s, corporations have greatly
expanded their use of mandatory arbitration clauses to compel the
arbitration of federal statutory rights.113 These arbitration clauses are
inserted into contracts that employees or consumers must sign as a
condition precedent to obtaining employment or obtaining a good or
service.114 Mandatory arbitration has become so popular among large
companies that one recent study found that around ninety-three percent of
leading telecommunications, credit, and financial firms employ arbitration
clauses in their contracts with employees.115 The proliferation of
mandatory, binding arbitration agreements often forces consumers and
employees to choose between accepting mandatory arbitration or foregoing
employment opportunities or the ability to purchase goods and services.116
Although mandatory arbitration may benefit some consumers by limiting
costs—perhaps ultimately reducing the price of goods and services—it also

111. See, e.g., Nesbitt, 811 F.3d at 376; Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916,
927 (9th Cir. 2013); Byrd v. SunTrust Bank, No. 2:12-cv-02314-JPM-cgc, 2013 WL
3816714, at *18–19 (W.D. Tenn. July 22, 2013).
112. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, H.R. 2087, 114th Cong. (2015).
113. Ashley M. Sergeant, Student Article, The Corporation’s New Lethal Weapon:
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses, 57 S.D. L. REV. 149, 149 (2012).
114. Id.
115. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of
Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
871, 886 (2008).
116. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking
the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/
business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html.
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threatens the ability of consumers and employees to pursue claims and
undermines federal statutory rights.
The effective vindication exception can provide a solution to both
problems if accorded the appropriate breadth. Rather than focusing the
effective vindication exception on the technical ability to access the arbitral
forum, as the Supreme Court did in Italian Colors,117 courts should instead
consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding an arbitration
agreement like the Tenth Circuit did in Nesbitt.118 When an arbitration
agreement expressly forbids the assertion of a federal statutory right, or
imposes arbitration-specific expenses119 that make access to the arbitral
forum impracticable, courts should invalidate the agreement under the
effective vindication exception if the party opposing arbitration meets its
burden of showing it will actually incur those expenses.120 But if the only
impediment facing the party opposing arbitration is the possibility that the
cost of proving its claim in arbitration might outweigh potential recovery on
that claim, such agreement must be upheld under the Court’s decisions in
Green Tree and Italian Colors.121
The Court’s decision to allow the compelled arbitration of federal
statutory rights in Mitsubishi was predicated on the ability to “effectively []
vindicate its statutory cause of action.”122 Additionally, as the United States
pointed out in its amicus brief in Italian Colors, “[p]rivate actions are a
vital supplement to government enforcement not only under the antitrust
laws, but also under a wide range of other federal statutes.”123 The Tenth
Circuit’s approach to the effective vindication exception in Nesbitt should
be adopted in order to ensure not only that prospective litigants may
effectively vindicate their rights, but also to ensure that private enforcement
of federal statutory rights remains a vital supplement to enforcement by the
government.

117. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013).
118. Nesbitt v. FCNH, Inc., 811 F.3d 371, 377 (10th Cir. 2016).
119. Arbitration specific costs include, inter alia, arbitration filing fees, arbitrators’
compensation costs, post-award cost shifting mechanisms, and “loser pays” provisions. See
Bykov, supra note 47, at 1346–53.
120. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91–92 (2000); Nesbitt, 811
F.3d at 380–81.
121. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310–11; Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 91–92.
122. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637
(1985).
123. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 33, Am.
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (No. 12-133), 2013 WL 367051.
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Additionally, broadening the application of the effective vindication
exception need not lead to a marked increase in the invalidation of
mandatory arbitration agreements. Companies could simply alter their
contracts to include “consumer-friendly” arbitration clauses that will
withstand cost-based challenges to compelled arbitration.124 In the wake of
the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, where
the Court praised AT&T’s consumer-friendly arbitration agreement,125
corporations were advised to adopt similar consumer-friendly provisions in
their own agreements to avoid judicial invalidation.126 One commentator
examined thirty-seven arbitration clauses post-Concepcion, noting that
nearly all the clauses had been amended, many to add pro-consumer
provisions.127 By adding consumer-friendly provisions to arbitration
agreements, potential defendants can ensure they will reap the benefits of
compelled arbitration of federal statutory rights without inhibiting the
ability of potential plaintiffs to vindicate those same rights.
V. Conclusion
As recent cases involving mandatory arbitration have demonstrated, the
Supreme Court maintains a very narrow view of the effective vindication
exception’s applicability. The Court’s detached focus on the right to
vindicate statutory claims disregards the practical realities that face many
employees and consumers subject to arbitration agreements. Such
individuals often cannot afford the filing fees and other costs associated
with arbitration, precluding the vindication of their federal statutory claims.
The Tenth Circuit’s approach to the effective vindication exception focuses
instead on the practical effects of an arbitration agreement by requiring an
accessible arbitral forum.
Arbitration represents an effective tool to expedite the resolution of
disputes and relieve an increasingly overcrowded court docket. Yet these
benefits do not justify the erosion of federal statutory rights that has
occurred over the past three decades. Individuals who sign arbitration
124. See Myriam Gilles, Killing Them With Kindness: Examining “Consumer-Friendly”
Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 844
(2012).
125. 563 U.S. 333, 351–52 (2011).
126. Gilles, supra note 124, at 844–45 (“Much of this advice explicitly urges prospective
defendants to follow AT&T’s lead by providing that all fees and costs of suit are recoverable
by a prevailing plaintiff, and by offering cash bounties where claimants receive an
arbitration award superior to defendant’s final pre-award offer, among other features.”).
127. Id. at 853.
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agreements often do so because they have little choice, largely due to the
differences in bargaining power and sophistication between large
corporations and individual employees or consumers. To rectify this
disparity, the Supreme Court should adopt the Tenth Circuit’s approach to
the effective vindication rule and acknowledge that a more flexible totality
of the circumstances approach will better serve the needs of individuals
without undermining the text or purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act.
Colby J. Byrd

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss3/7

